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Abstract 
This paper analyses trade and financial openness effects on growth and income 
inequality in 35 OECD countries. Our model takes into account both short run and long 
run effects of factors explaining income divergence between and within the countries. 
We estimate, for the period 1995-2016, an error correction model in which per capita 
GDP and inequality are driven by changes over time of selected factors and by the 
deviation from a long run relationship. Stylised facts suggest that trade and financial 
openness reduce the growth gaps across the countries but not income inequality, and 
the effects of finance are stronger in high income countries. Nevertheless, low and 
middle income countries benefit more from international trade. Our contribution to the 
existing literature is threefold: i) we study the short and long run effects of trade and 
financial openness on income level and distribution, ii) we focus on developed 
countries (OECD) rather than on developing and iii) we provide a sensitivity analysis 
including in our baseline equation an institutional indicator, a trade agreement proxy 
and a dummy of global financial crisis. Estimates results indicate that trade openness 
significantly improved the conditions of OECD low income countries both in short and 
long run mostly, consistently with the catching up theory. It also decreased inequality, 
but only in low and middle income countries. Differently financial openness had a 
positive and significant impact only in the short run on middle income countries and 
increased income disparities within countries in the short term in low income countries 
and in the long term in high income countries. 
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Growth divergence and income inequality in 
OECD countries: the role of trade and 
financial openness 
 
1. Introduction 
The impact of trade and financial openness on income level and distribution is at the 
centre of the current international economic policy debate also at OECD level. Trade 
and financial integration have been an engine for growth in many countries by 
enhancing efficiency and widening the market for national products. Nevertheless, 
increasing trade and financial flows between countries, in conjunction with 
technological progress, are often cited as worsening income inequality and growth rate 
disparity. In this regard, opinions diverge between economists who argue that free 
trade and capital movements are the key to economic growth being associated to more 
efficient use of resources and eventually reduce inequalities, and others arguing that 
the openness might itself be a factor leading to inequality, at least in the short run, 
fostering the progress of few high competitive firms and sectors and the remuneration 
only of the most in-demand jobs.  
The present study analyses the effects of trade and financial integration on growth and 
income inequality in OECD countries, where most factors explaining the divergence 
in emerging countries such as technology, demography and education, have arguably 
a relatively minor effect. It also takes into account that trade and financial openness 
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might have different, and possibly opposite, outcomes in the short and in the long run 
and across countries, thus determining both winners and losers.  
The relationship between trade openness and income disparities is intensively debated 
in theoretical and empirical economic literature. The standard trade theory, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model (H-O), predicts that countries should experience, after 
converging, equal trends as a consequence of globalization. The Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, one of the most important corollaries of the H-O model, states that openness 
would benefit a country’s relatively abundant factor, since trade specialization will 
favour sectors intensive in the abundant factor. However, if the basic framework of 
the model is extended, for example, to account for multiple skill-related categories of 
workers (Wood, 1994), different country groups (Davis, 1996) and traded goods 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 2003), the main distributive prediction of the theorem is 
theoretically undetermined and depends on the relative weights and directions of 
trade flows. 1  Also the impact of financial integration on economic growth and 
distribution is broadly analysed in the literature (see Naceur and Zhang 2016 for a 
survey) however, the studies on the relationship between financial development and 
income distribution are still blossoming. Theories on the effect of financial integration 
on income distribution are still inconclusive: one strand of the literature proposes an 
inverted-U relationship between finance and income inequality, while the other 
predicts a linear relationship.  
Our contribution to the existing empirical literature is threefold: i) we use an error 
correction model (ECM) applied to panel data to investigate the trade and financial 
integration’s impact on levels and distribution of income in the main OECD countries 
                                                   
1  Furthermore, if the model assumption of homogeneous production functions among 
countries is relaxed, then international openness may facilitate technology diffusion from High 
Income Countries to Low and Middle Income ones, and it is very likely that the new 
technologies are more skill intensive in relation to those in use domestically before trade 
liberalization. If this is the case, then openness – via technology – might determine a counter-
effect to the theorem prediction, (i.e. an increase in the demand for skilled labor, an increase in 
wage dispersion and in income inequality (Lee and Vivarelli, 2006). 
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in the short- and long run. Moreover consistently with the findings of the descriptive 
analysis we provide separate estimates for the whole OECD sample and for the 
countries divided in the three GDP per capita groups (low, middle and high income); 
ii) we focus on OECD countries that share, in the period under observation, relatively 
similar technologies and human capital levels especially when disentangled for 
homogeneous income levels groups; and iii) we provide a sensitivity analysis 
introducing in the estimates a dummy for the global financial crisis, an institutional 
indicator, a trade agreements proxy and interacting the trade openness with the two 
latter regressors. Furthermore, the empirical evidence provided by this paper might 
have interesting policy implications in the context of current trends characterized by 
retreat from globalization and rising protectionism, especially in advanced economies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 present a brief survey of literature , section 
3 reports the main stylized facts on trade openness and income distribution in the 
OECD countries. Section 4 describes the equations, dataset and empirical strategy that 
our argument is based on. Section 5 presents the econometric results, while section 6 
reports robustness checks. Conclusions and policy implications follow.  
2. Trade and financial openness, income levels and 
inequality: A survey of literature 
As for the role of trade openness on growth and inequality in advanced countries  this 
paper draws specifically on two different though related strands of empirical research. 
The first strand examines the impact of international trade on countries’ income 
convergence and starts from the seminal Frankel and Romer paper (1999). Many 
empirical studies supporting or opposing trade openness drew their results from cross 
sectional data and were subject to an important criticism in terms of estimates 
robustness. In particular, Edwards (1998) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) argue that 
the strong results in favour of openness may arise from mis-specified models and/or 
openness measures and may be acting as a proxy for other macroeconomic policies or 
Growth divergence and income inequality 
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other important omitted factors such as institutions and geography. The literature 
results are still inconclusive. In fact, criticisms of free trade and the current debate 
suggest that income disparity is triggered by international trade only between 
heterogeneous countries. On the other side of the debate, some authors suggest that 
free trade might reduce income inequality across countries.2  
The effects of trade on incomes in the advanced countries have been much studied, 
beginning with a number of works on wage distributions in the 1990s, to more recent 
papers on the effects of globalisation on the labour share (Elsby et al. 2013), wage 
inequality (Ebenstein et al. 2015), and routine middle class jobs (Autor et al. 2014). 
More specifically in advanced economies, the ability of firms to adopt labour saving 
technologies and offshoring has been cited as an important driver of the decline in 
manufacturing and rising skill premium (Feenstra and Hanson 2003). However Quah 
(1996) argued that income convergence, if any, occurs within different “clubs” of 
countries, rather than across all the economies at the same time. 
The second strand of research analyses the impact of international trade on within 
income inequality. Lakner and Milanovic (2016) popularised the “elephant graph” 
representing income dynamics between 1988 and 2008. It shows that very poor 
households, belonging to the first decile of income distribution, benefitted only to a 
minor extent from overall growth; income growth rate increased until the median 
income earners drawing the back of the elephant in the graph; the growth rate fell close 
to 0 for the households in the 7th to the 9th decile of income distribution and picked 
up for the richest households, resembling the elephant’s trunk.  
                                                   
2 Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), in their studies of historical trends in globalization and 
inequality, conclude that globalization was a driving force for between-country convergence 
since the 19th century. However, Dowrick and Golley (2004) reveal that while trade openness 
promoted convergence in the 1960s and 1970s, since 1980 the benefits of trade are mostly 
attributed to the richer economies, with modest benefits to the less developed economies. Sala-
i-Martin et al. (2004) finds that overall global inequality has been falling since 1980, due to 
between-country convergence. 
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Many papers provide evidence of a positive relationship between trade openness and 
inequality in developed countries.3 They obtain different estimates of the reactivity of 
inequality to trade and financial openness, depending on the estimation sample, the 
statistical techniques adopted and the control variables included in the models. Lim 
and McNelis (2016) use a panel of annual data from 1992 for about 40 countries below 
the average world’s per capita GDP and find an elasticity of the Gini index about 0.05, 
though it roughly doubles for low-income countries and turns negative for upper-
middle countries. Bumann and Lensink (2016) report an average elasticity of the same 
inequality index to financial openness, measured by the Chinn and Ito (2008) index, 
close to 2, considering 106 countries over the time period 1973 to 2008 and controlling 
for inflation, trade openness, financial depth, per capita GDP, education and 
demographic indicators. They also adopt a GMM estimator to treat the possible 
endogeneity of some explanatory variables and conclude that financial liberalization 
improves income distribution in countries where financial depth is higher. 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) study about 100 countries, including the most advanced 
economies, during the period 1980–2012, and estimate an elasticity of Gini index that 
is negligible to trade openness and is 0.05 respect to financial openness. Their reference 
model includes among the control variables: education, financial depth and some 
indicators on the structure of population and labour market, other than public 
expenditure. Roser and Cuaresma (2016) estimate a model on a panel of 32 developed 
countries over the last four decades by using GMM and find an elasticity of Gini index 
to trade openness of about 0.01, controlling for public expenditure, GDP growth, per 
capita GDP and international trade structure. 
Also the literature on the impact of financial integration, on growth and inequality 
provide heterogeneous results. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) predict a nonlinear 
relationship between finance and inequality underlining that the distributional effect 
                                                   
3 For instance, Helpman et al. (2012) and Akerman et al. (2013) analyse the role of trade in 
increasing intra-sector wage disparity in a number of developed and developing countries.  
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of financial integration depends on the level of economic development.4 They suggest 
that financial deepening eases credit constraints, which benefits low-income groups 
through the channels of human capital and capital accumulation. Although theory 
provides conflicting conclusions on the finance-inequality relationship, empirical 
works suggest that financial integration contributes to increase income and reduce 
inequality. Cross-country evidence from Beck et al. (2007) and Rajan and Zingales 
(2003), for example, suggests that expanding private credit can stimulate income 
growth for the poorest quintiles and reduce income inequality. More recent papers 
attempted to include other dimensions of financial development. For example, 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) establish that financial instability worsens poverty and 
Kunieda and co-authors (2011) find that financial integration aggravates income 
inequality by benefiting the most privileged. Similarly, Furceri and Loungani (2015) 
study the impact of capital account openness on inequality and find that liberalizing 
domestic financial systems can worsen income inequality, both in the short and 
medium run.  
3. Some stylized facts on trade and financial openness, 
growth and income inequality in OECD countries 
All in all, in the OECD, trade and financial integration seem to have contributed to 
reduce the gaps of per-capita incomes across countries over time, as shown in panels 
a and b of Figure 1, though the relationship between income dispersion and openness 
is strongly non-linear. Indeed, openness seems to widen or to keep almost constant 
income disparities before a given threshold, and to reduce it afterward.  
  
                                                   
4 At early stages of development, only the rich can access financial services because of the fixed 
cost of joining the financial coalition, resulting in wider income inequality. As the economy 
develops, the financial system becomes more accessible and affordable to the poor because 
human capital replaces physical capital as the main driver of growth.  
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Figure 1. Trade and financial openness, growth and income inequality in OECD 
countries* (yearly weighted averages) 
 
*Interpolating dashed lines are locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) estimates. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on OECD, Solt (2016) and EWNII (2017) data. 
Income inequality within each country seems to increase as globalization proceeds, as 
panel c and d of Figure 1 suggest. Notably, the effect of trade and financial openness 
on domestic inequality is more linear than in the previous case.  
Estimating the unconditional elasticity of per capita income and inequality to trade 
and financial openness in each country provides some further insight on the effects of 
globalization. For each OECD member the regression ln(yt) – ln(yt-1) = hyx (ln(xt) – 
ln(xt-1)) was estimated, where y was in turn per capita GDP in volume in US$ and the 
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Gini index5 computed on disposable income, and x was one of the openness indicators. 
The main results are summarized in Figure 2, where the estimated elasticities are 
plotted against per capita GDP levels. 
Figure 2. Elasticity of per capita income and inequality* (country averages) 
 
*Interpolating dashed lines are locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) estimates. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on OECD, Solt (2016) and EWNII (2017) data. 
Although data variability is large, Figure 2 suggests that the relationships between 
globalization indicators (i.e. trade and financial openness) and income vary with 
national development level. For instance, panel a of Figure 2 shows that the growth 
rate of low income countries is related to trade integration more than in high income 
countries. Contrarily, the elasticity of growth to financial openness, reported in panel 
                                                   
5 The benchmark for the Gini index is the equidistribution of income among the individuals, 
that could differ from the social preferences about income inequality. Thus an increase of the 
index could reflect also a change in the attitude toward income disparity. 
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b, seems to be higher in the richest OECD members. When international trade 
intensifies, income inequality the Gini index is lower mostly in low and middle-income 
countries (panel c of Figure 2). 
In any case, the evidence reported in Figure 2 suggests that the relationships among 
the relevant variables are non-linear and are likely influenced by country-specific 
factors. Thus, in the empirical analysis that follows we ranked the OECD countries 
according to their increasing per capita GDP level and then created three groups, each 
including one third of countries, henceforth named “low”, “middle” and “high” 
income OECD countries.6 
4. Equation, dataset and methodology 
In contrast to most of the empirical literature on this issue, our model specification 
takes into account both the short run effects of per capita income and inequality 
explaining factors, that arguably might be relatively small and temporary, and their 
long run impacts. Separating the short and long run impact might have important 
policy implications because it helps in revealing factors that might be permanent 
driving forces for fostering growth and/or reducing inequality (and thus have to be 
targeted by the policies) from those that are just temporary. 
We thus estimate an ECM, in which the dynamics of growth and income inequality 
are driven by short run elasticity with respect to some selected influencing factors and 
by the deviation from a long run relationship. Pesaran et al. (1995) and Westerlund 
(2007) analyse the estimation of ECM using panel data.  
                                                   
6 Low per capita income countries includes: Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Turkey. Middle per capita 
income countries includes: Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, New 
Zealand, Slovenia, Spain and United Kingdom. High per capita income countries includes: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United States. 
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The linear formulation of the model is: 
Dyit = ∑ "## ∆%#&'  – b0(yit-1−∑ )## %#&'*+) + di+ qt + uit    [1] 
where the change between the periods of time t-1 and t of the endogenous variable y 
measured on the i-th individual of the panel is explained by the changes of a number 
of explanatory variables xj whose short run impact on Dyit is measured by the 
parameters aj; the past deviation of yi from the long run relationship ∑ )## %#&'*+; a set 
of country dummies di representing time invariant country specific omitted variables, 
and time dummies qt representing common time-varying factors not included in the 
model; the idiosyncratic term uit. The convergence speed to the long run relationship 
(not necessarily an equilibrium condition) is measured by the positive parameter b0.7 
A generalization of [1] includes a set of long run relationships, corresponding to 
possible multiple cointegration relationships between the variables y and xj.  
The formulation [1] holds both for stationary and non-stationary time series, but in the 
latter case the long run relationship exists, i.e. b0 is not null, only if y and xj are 
cointegrated. Assuming that no explanatory variable is endogenous, the model [1] can 
be estimated consistently by running a standard fixed effects GLS, as shown by 
Westerlund (2007). Alternatively, a two-step procedure can be adopted, similar to the 
one originally proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) for time series data. In the first 
step the static long run relationship  
yit= ∑ )## %#&' + di+ qt + vit        [2] 
is estimated by using GLS, since cointegration of non-stationary variables grants the 
“super-consistency” of estimates (but not of corresponding standard errors), as shown 
by Stock (1987). 
                                                   
7 A negative value of b0 would signal a permanent divergence from the supposed long run 
relationship, which casts doubts on the existence of the latter “attractor” itself. 
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We test our model for the period 1995–2016 for 35 OECD countries. Consistent with 
the descriptive analysis, we disentangle our regressions in three  groups (low, middle 
high) according to countries’ level of GDP per capita. 
The aforementioned literature suggests that a reliable model explaining income 
inequality between and within countries should include explanatory variables, in 
addition to per-capita income starting level and trade and financial openness. For 
instance, the level of human capital, the structure of foreign exchanges, industrial 
structure, fiscal policy, FDI and market liberalization should be considered. 
Nevertheless, this study focuses on the OECD countries and on the last few decades, 
during which income inequality within each country apparently kept rising again after 
the “great levelling” of the middle part of the past century. Most candidate 
explanatory variables display relatively low variability across time and across 
countries, thus we assume that their influence might be captured by a combination of 
country dummies that implicitly take into account permanent differences in human 
capital, sectorial specialization, business environment, etc., and a time dummy that 
ideally accounts for the effect of common shocks and a common evolution of omitted 
(and unobservable) variables.  
Relying on previous literature we include in the regressions explaining national per 
capita GDP in volume (GDP_pck) and income inequality (ineq)8 the following common 
set of variables, all transformed in logarithms: i) a trade openness indicator 
(trade_open); ii) a de facto measure of financial openness index (fin_open) given by the 
sum of financial assets plus liabilities divided by the GDP of the previous period; iii) 
the terms of trade (terms_trade); iv) the value added per employed person with tertiary 
education (lp_a) as a proxy of the contribution to growth of human capital; v) the 
public expenditure divided by previous year GDP (pe_GDP); and vi) interests on 
                                                   
8 In our model we use the post-tax Gini index since it has a wider coverage and comparability 
in terms of years and countries than other, possibly more accurate, inequality measures. 
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public debt divided by previous year GDP (int_GDP). In addition the labour share (LS) 
has been included in the inequality equation.  
The key variables for our analysis are trade_open and fin_open. It is worth noting that 
there is no unique indication in which manner trade should enter growth estimations. 
A commonly used measure in the analyses of the relationship between trade and 
growth is total trade volume (of both goods and services) as a share of total GDP 
(trade_open). The trade-to-GDP ratio is often referred to as the “trade openness ratio”. 
Following (Busse Konninger, 2012) we use trade_open calculated as exports and 
imports of goods and services in current US$ divided by total GDP in current US$ 
lagged by one period. Tables with the description, data sources and descriptive 
statistics of the variables are provided in the appendix. As for the financial openness 
indicator we selected a de facto indicator. We preferred it over the de iure Chin Ito 
index because the latter has a very low variability after 1995 across OECD members 
and available data end in 2011.9 
5. Estimates results 
The ECM model [1] was estimated using GLS mainly to assess the relevance of trade 
and financial openness in explaining the disparities of per capita GDP growth across 
OECD countries and their effect on income inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, within the same countries. As we have already underlined, the ECM model 
                                                   
9 All those measures might be highly imperfect. One of the drawbacks connected with de facto 
measures is that the choice in favour of one of them leaves the information contained in all the 
others de facto measures aside. Thus, whatever measure of actual financial integration is 
chosen, it risks containing incomplete and thus distorting information on the process. On the 
other hand, the de jure indicators, even though in a majority of cases they are based on 
summary information revealed in the IMF’s AREAER reports, should in principle contain more 
complete information on the formal – and potentially also on actual – financial liberalization 
than de facto measures do. Consequently, especially in the case of more developed economies, 
to the extent to which de jure financial openness leads also to de facto liberalization episodes, 
the former could be to a certain degree treated as a proxy for the latter. 
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allows one to distinguish between the short and long run effects of the aforementioned 
regressors. 
Table 1 presents the estimates results for the whole OECD sample and for the countries 
divided in the three GDP per capita groups (low, middle and high income) consistent 
with the descriptive analysis. In the second column, there are the estimates of the 
baseline equation augmented with interaction terms between trade openness financial 
openness and GDP per capita. 
The estimates show, with no exception, that in the short run trade openness in the 
period 1995–2016 had a positive impact on growth although the coefficients present 
different magnitudes — the greatest being for low income countries.  
The interaction terms in the second column suggest that the level of lagged per capita 
GDP exerts a negative impact on the elasticity of growth to trade both in the short and 
long run (-0.12 and -0.09 respectively). This result confirms the graphical evidence 
presented in Chart 2, where the OECD countries with high income level apparently 
benefited less from trade integration. The opposite occurs for when considering 
financial integration. Therefore, the interaction coefficient has a positive and 
significant value both in the short and long run (0.05 and 0.02 respectively). It follows 
that richest countries benefit more from open financial markets, possibly 
compensating for the relative loss on the market of goods and services. 
Thus, trade seems to improve mostly the conditions of OECD low income countries, 
consistently with the neoclassical catching up theory stating that countries with lower 
income levels grow faster in order to converge to the income of more advanced 
countries. The OECD middle income group tends to react less to the trade openness 
than the two other groups. This determines the fact that its income convergence is 
weaker than in the other two groups. This result is in line with the evidence provided 
by the descriptive paragraph and with the decrease of the overall income inequality 
between countries pointed out by the literature on trade globalization advantages. 
This result also suggests that middle income countries tend to lose position in the 
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global value chain, possibly because of the increasing competition with low-income 
economies and outsourcing processes, as argued also by Cattaneo, Gereffi and Staritz 
(2010) and Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2013), who conjecture a “middle income trap”, 
since these countries are no longer competitive in standardized, labour-intensive 
commodities, but their productivity is too low to compete in higher value-added 
industries. 
Notably, trade intensification had a positive effect on growth also in the long run, 
particularly for the middle group, suggesting that their shortfall in the short run might 
be temporary. It is worth underlining, however, that this analysis does not catch 
possible adverse permanent outcomes due to the hysteresis effect of short term relative 
losses. Financial openness had a positive and significant impact only in the short run 
on middle income countries, being not statistically significant for the other two groups.  
This fact on the one side might ease the weaker convergence of middle income 
economies, but on the other side strengthens the position only of countries that are 
more active on the financial market, accentuating the relative loss of the others. In any 
case, in the long run, financial openness had only a negligible permanent effect on 
growth, suggesting that capital markets can sustain national growth but do not 
represent a permanent driving factor. 
The terms of trade exert heterogeneous impacts on the three groups and over time. In 
the short run they have a negative impact on the OECD group as a whole, likely 
because their negative effect on price competition against the rest of the world.  
Particularly, the growth of middle income countries seems to be negatively affected 
by a rise of the relative prices of national products, confirming the difficult competitive 
position of those countries. However, in the long run, gaining terms of trade seems to 
have fostered growth in the OECD countries as a whole, possibly because the positive 
effect of market power and quality of goods prevail. As expected, this effect is 
significant in less developed countries but not within each group of OECD countries. 
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Thus it contributes to make the growth of advanced economies converge toward a 
common trend.  
Public expenditure had a negative impact on per capita income growth. In the short 
run low income OECD members are particularly impaired by the weight of the 
government on the economy, while in the long run public consumption and 
investment seem to crowd out private expenditure especially in middle and high 
income countries.  
Apparently, interest paid on public debt hampered the overall growth of OECD 
members in the short run, but not within each of the three groups of countries, possibly 
because this payment ultimately redistributes income within the countries belonging 
to the same club. In the long run, high income countries seem to take advantage of this 
special item of the public expenditure, possibly because it raises the national 
disposable income of households and corporations. 
The return on education, approximated here by the value added per employed person 
with tertiary education, had a positive impact on per capita income on the whole 
sample and on high income countries both in the long and short run, and on middle 
income countries just in the long run. A possible reason is that the tertiary education 
produces a high return where there are suitable “infrastructures” to make it profitable. 
Table 2 shows that trade openness has a negative relationship with the Gini index in 
low and middle income countries, both in the short and long run, but not in high 
income economies and not in the whole OECD sample. In this table we present an 
augmented version of the baseline equation including interaction terms between trade 
and financial openness and per capita GDP. The estimates results show that countries 
with higher per capita GDP benefited less from the equalising impact of trade 
integration both in short and long run (respectively by 0.04 and 0.02 per unit of 
income) while the effect of financial integration on inequality is almost insensitive to 
per capita GDP level.   
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Table 1. Estimates results: trade and financial integration and growth (1995-2016) 
  OECD low income middle income high income 
Short run effects 
D.trade_open 0.0888*** 1.352*** 0.266*** 0.0664*** 0.0797*** 
 
(0.0137) (0.265) (0.0729) (0.0209) (0.0216) 
D.fin_open 0.0141* -0.534*** -0.0204 0.0182** -0.00534 
 
(0.00764) (0.177) (0.0524) (0.009219 (0.0131) 
D.terms_trade -0.0551* -0.0335 0.0163 -0.104** -0.0404 
 
(0.0297) (0.0306) (0.2659) (0.0486) (0.0386) 
D.ppe_GDP -0.153*** -0.232*** -0.229** -0.137*** -0.163*** 
 
(0.0191) (0.0209) (0.08829) (0.0341) (0.0218) 
D.int_GDP -0.00637** -0.00740** -0.0223 -0.00301 -0.00363 
 
(0.0028) (0.00295) (0.0151) (0.00395) (0.00445) 
D.lp_a 0.0273** -0.0110 -0.0313 0.0203 0.0331** 
 
(0.0108) (0.0102) (0.0492) (0.0184) (0.0148) 
D.trade_gdp  -0.121***    
 
 (0.0254)    
D.fin_gdp  0.0515***    
 
 (0.0169)       
Long run effects 
L.GDP_pck -0.0897*** -0.120*** -0.102* -0.0599*** -0.0959*** 
 
(0.013) (0.0133) (0.0596) (0.0225) (0.0249) 
L.trade_open 0.0689*** 0.970*** 0.258*** 0.0820*** 0.0239* 
 
(0.00952) (0.198) (0.0621) (0.0172) (0.014) 
L.fin_open 0.00394 -0.208*** 0.0375 0.00251 -0.00169 
 
(0.00421) (0.0778) (0.0415) (0.00588) (0.00652) 
L.terms_trade 0.0288** 0.0231* -0.0897 0.0352 0.0157 
 
(0.0119) (0.0135) (0.277) (0.0228) (0.0139) 
L.ppe_GDP -0.0941*** -0.129*** -0.182 -0.125*** -0.0974*** 
 
(0.0138) (0.0151) (0.109) (0.0229) (0.0178) 
L.int_GDP 0.00224 0.00325* -0.0159 0.00288 0.00914*** 
 
(0.00184) (0.00184) (0.0172) (0.003) (0.00266) 
L.lp_a 0.0269*** 0.0164*** -0.0394 0.0273*** 0.0285*** 
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(0.0053) (0.00481) (0.0479) (0.00776) (0.00875) 
L.trade_gdp  -0.0881***    
 
 (0.0190)    
L.fin_gdp  0.0199***    
 
 (0.00732)    
Constant 1.403*** 1.817*** 1.537 1.233*** 1.475*** 
 
(0.158) (0.156) (0.974) (0.269) (0.286) 
Observations 513 495 65 222 226 
R-squared 0.692 0.614 0.914 0.687 0.776 
Number of cod 26 26 4 11 11 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2. Estimates results: trade and financial integration and income inequality (1995-
2016) 
  OECD low income* middle income 
high 
income 
Short run effects 
D.trade_open -0.0112 -0.396* -0.0536*** -0.0426*** 0.00515 
 
(0.00987) (0.210) (0.011) (0.0138) (0.015) 
D.fin_open 0.0136** 0.0992 0.0207*** 0.0151 0.0134 
 
(0.00685) (0.143) (0.00718) (0.00967) (0.0103) 
D.ppe_GDP -0.0207 -0.0140 0.00586 -0.0359 -0.00716 
 
(0.0141) (0.0126) (0.0185) (0.026) (0.0175) 
D.int_GDP 0.00333* 0.00234 0.00372* 0.00703*** 0.00229 
 
(0.00176) (0.00153) (0.00214) (0.00213) 
(0.00299
) 
D.lp_a -0.00394 -0.00608 0.0172* 0.0316** -0.0193* 
 
(0.0074) (0.00574) (0.00931) (0.0124) (0.0105) 
D.LS 0.0344 0.0172   -0.142* 0.196** 
 
(0.0521) (0.0438)   (0.0734) (0.0759) 
D.trade_gdp 0.0372*     
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(0.0199)     
D.fin_gdp 
 
-0.00817     
  
(0.0136)       
Long term effects 
L.ineq -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.0302 -0.0711** -0.132*** 
 
(0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0225) (0.0307) (0.03) 
L.trade_open -0.00503 -0.237* -0.0263*** -0.0312*** 0.00995 
 
(0.00628) (0.133) (0.00756) (0.00818) 
(0.00971
) 
L.fin_open 0.00840** (0.0126) -0.00863** -0.0074 0.0118** 
 
(0.00335) 0.0900 (0.00345) (0.0063) (0.0046) 
L.ppe_GDP -0.0254** -0.0137 0.0171 -0.0462** -0.00889 
 
(0.0116) (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0207) (0.0154) 
L.int_GDP 0.00274** 0.00127 0.00478*** 0.00747*** -0.00198 
 
(0.00129) (0.00110) (0.00164) (0.00175) 
(0.00202
) 
L.lp_a 0.00309 0.00360 -0.00215 -8.12E-05 -0.00506 
 
(0.00358) (0.00297) (0.00434) (0.00499) 
(0.00675
) 
L.LS 0.00222 0.000736   -0.0152 0.0557 
 
(0.0253) (0.0239)   (0.0375) (0.0389) 
L.trade_gdp 0.0225*     
  
(0.0126)     
L.fin_gdp 
 
-0.00754     
  
(0.00535)     
Constant 0.450*** 0.460*** 0.0192 0.458* 0.205 
 
(0.157) (0.152) (0.099) (0.256) (0.218) 
Observations 368 353 209 135 212 
R-squared 0.163 0.180 0.345 0.48 0.263 
Number of 
cod 19 19 11 7 11 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES   YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 * The coefficients of LS are not estimated 
for the first group of countries because too much data are missing for this variable.  
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Financial integration had negative impact on income disparities in the full OECD 
sample with diverging effects among the countries.  The overall divergence effect 
holds both in the short and long run and is likely related to the earnings of workers 
and entrepreneurs acting in the sector of financial services. However it seems that in 
the long term the financial integration reduced inequality in low-income countries but 
the magnitude of the coefficient is very small. In the short run, this outcome is stronger 
in low-income countries, where the corresponding industry is less developed, 
although in the long-term the gain tends to spread out to the other sectors, contributing 
to the equalization of incomes. 
By contrast, in the high income OECD, members’ financial openness contributed to 
worsen income distribution in the long run, when being on the frontier of financial 
innovation grants a permanent advantage to the financial industry. Notably, the speed 
of convergence of the inequality to the corresponding long run relationship (i.e. the 
coefficient of ineqt-1) is larger in high income countries, the longer-term trend towards 
inequality resulting from financial openness, that is the only statistically significant in 
the ECM component of the model, is dominating in this group of countries.  
Among the control variables, public expenditure net of interest on public debt seems 
to contribute to reduce inequality significantly only in the long run, and particularly 
in middle income OECD members. On the contrary, the rent provided by the interest 
on public debt worsened income distribution, particularly in low and middle income 
countries.  
The role played by tertiary education is mixed. The value added per skilled worker 
had a negligible effect on inequality in the OECD as a whole and in the long run. 
However, in the short run lp_a worsened income distribution in low and middle 
income countries, while improving it in the richest OECD members. A tentative 
explanation is that skilled workers and hi-tech enterprises, who earn more than 
average, are relatively few in less advanced countries, and are abundant in the richest 
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countries. Thus, increasing their share of value added had adverse effects on income 
inequality in the first two group of countries, but not in the third. 
The effect of the labour share on income inequality is apparently negligible for the 
OECD as a whole, also because its variability along the time is limited and the 
differences across the countries are quite stable. Moreover, LS is not available for most 
low income countries. It turns out that the country and time dummies in the model 
likely capture most of the effect of LS on inequality. Nevertheless, increasing the 
labour share had positive effects on inequality in the middle income countries, as 
expected, and positive in the high income OECD members, that is less explicable 
Table 3 provides a summary of main estimates results. 
Table 3. Summary of main estimate results* 
 short/long Low income Middle income High income 
Trade openness 
growth +/+ +/+ +/+ 
inequality -/- -/- +/+ 
Financial openness 
growth -/+ +/+ -/- 
inequality +/- +/- +/+ 
*signs in red are not statistically significant. The first sign refers to the short run impact and the second 
one to the long term effect. 
6. Robustness check: the role of institutional quality, trade 
agreements and global financial crisis 
In this section we provide some robustness checks, introducing into the original 
specification (see Table 1 and 2) three additional regressors: i) an institutional variable 
on government effectiveness which refers to the capacity of a government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies, taken from the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank10; ii) a euro dummy as a proxy of trade 
                                                   
10  The WGI comprises six governance indicators. Voice and Accountability, and Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism relate to the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced. Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality refer to 
the capacity of a government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies. Rule of 
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integration among a group of countries within the OECD. We selected the EMU as the 
form of tightest trade agreement since the OECD members already constitute a very 
well integrated market; and iii) a dummy proxying the global financial crisis that 
occurred in 2008, extrapolated by the year dummies used as controls.  
Concerning the institutional quality indicator, in interpreting the analysis we need to 
take into account all the caveats associated with the use of signals coming from 
qualitative survey indicators. We also tested the explanatory capacity of the 
expenditure in R&D as percentage of GDP, but this regressor was not statistically 
significant, probably because investment in R&D has very long run returns that are 
hard to capture by the few lags that can be practically introduced in our sample. We 
also included in our regressions interaction terms between trade openness and 
governments effectiveness and trade openness and the euro regressors.  
The effect of trade agreements on income and growth is controversial. On the one 
hand, lowering trade barriers is likely to foster international trade by reducing 
transaction costs, which in turn can enhance economic growth rates of all participants. 
Likewise, it can be argued that economies that are more open to the rest of the world 
have more chances to take advantage of technologies developed elsewhere. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that some forms of protectionism can be beneficial for 
economic development in the long run to strengthen certain industries or sectors or a 
strategic trade policy in key sectors.11  
                                                   
Law and Control of Corruption concern the respect of citizens and the State for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them. They are based on over 30 
individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. Estimates of 
governance ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) performance. For a full 
methodological explanation see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). 
11  The empirical literature on this issue is inconclusive especially for what concerns the 
advanced economies and the period after the Great Recession, as argued among the others by 
Georgiadis and Gräb (2016). 
Growth divergence and income inequality 
 22 
With the inclusion of these terms the estimated parameters indicate how the coefficient 
of the original regressor change as the interacted variable increases (or is 1 in the case 
of the euro dummy). Notably, the baseline model estimates proved to be robust to the 
inclusion of euro agreement, institutional quality and interactions (see tables A3 and 
A4 in the Appendix) proving the robustness of the baseline model. 
The estimates show that the only group benefiting from the introduction of the single 
currency was that of high income countries while the middle income group suffered a 
negative effect. The interaction of the euro dummy with trade openness affected 
negatively in the short run and long run middle income countries reinforcing the 
previous result (Table 4).  
The concentration of negative impacts deriving from trade integration in middle 
income countries might be related to the prevalence on average for the group of trade 
diversion over trade creation effects possibly because only five countries of 12 are 
EMU members (see De Nardis et al 2008 a and b). The government effectiveness had 
a positive impact on growth only in the long run and in the middle income countries.  
As for the interaction of the latter with trade openness, the coefficient indicates that it 
reduced the advantages of trade for the OECD area as whole, particularly in the long 
run and for high income countries. One possible explanation relies on the fact that the 
effective implementation of provisions on environmental protection and product 
quality might have reduced trade profits margin and consequently returns on income 
per capita. 
EMU membership proved to reduce inequality in middle income countries and to 
increase it in high income countries (Table 5). If interacted with trade openness, 
however, it decreased inequality in short and long run in middle and high income 
countries. 
Government effectiveness in low income countries decreased inequality in short and 
long run. While in the long run the quality of institutions have worsened the inequality 
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in high income countries. The interaction with trade openness on inequality confirmed 
these results.  
Table 4. Institutional quality, trade agreements and global financial crisis and growth 
(1995-2016) 
  OECD low income* middle income high income 
Short run effects 
D.trade_open 0.0976*** 0.258*** 0.0557** 0.0941*** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0813) (0.0240) (0.0300) 
D.government effectiveness -0.00868 0.0244 0.00356 -0.00496 
 
(0.00889) (0.0273) (0.0142) (0.0209) 
euro -0.00499 0.0156 -0.00362 -0.00668 
 (0.00405) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.00616) 
D.trade*euro -0.00829 -0.0417 -0.00824 0.0252* 
 
(0.00876) (0.0404) (0.0224) (0.0131) 
D.trade*gov -0.0445*** -0.0320 -0.0182 -0.0309 
 
(0.0123) (0.0690) (0.0213) (0.0365) 
Long run effects 
L.trade_open 0.0788*** 0.263*** 0.0722*** 0.0654** 
 
(0.0109) (0.0553) (0.0204) (0.0255) 
L. government effectiveness -0.00961 0.106*** -0.00694 0.00228 
 (0.00785) (0.0258) (0.0145) (0.0216) 
L.trade*euro 0.00242 -0.0160 0.0165 0.0194 
 
(0.00656) (0.0497) (0.0250) (0.0121) 
L.trade*gov -0.0536*** -0.111 -0.0267 -0.0828** 
 
(0.0117) (0.101) (0.0251) (0.0379) 
Crisis_2008 -0.0233*** 0.00809 -0.0355*** -0.0240*** 
 (0.00580) (0.0303) (0.0101) (0.00730) 
Observations 470 61 202 207 
R-squared 0.730 0.971 0.721 0.803 
Number of cod 26 4 11 11 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 5. Institutional quality, trade agreements and global financial crisis and income 
inequality (1995-2016) 
  OECD low income* middle income high income 
 
Short run effects 
 
D.trade_open -0.0170* -0.0157 -0.0268** -0.0288 
 
 
(0.0100) (0.0174) (0.0122) (0.0197) 
 
D.government effectiveness 0.00519 -0.0160** 0.00204 -0.000670 
 
 
(0.00634) (0.00631) (0.00681) (0.0137) 
 
euro 0.00299 0.000269 -0.0120* 0.0108** 
 
 
(0.00282) (0.00401) (0.00715) (0.00445) 
 
D.trade*euro 0.00290 0.0126 -0.0242** -0.00261 
 
 
(0.00513) (0.00827) (0.0101) (0.00849) 
 
D.trade*gov 0.0215** -0.0206 0.0189* 0.0475* 
 
 
(0.0100) (0.0155) (0.0108) (0.0261) 
 
Long run effects 
L.trade_open -0.00617 -0.0446** -0.0165* -0.0271 
 
 
(0.00679) (0.0210) (0.00987) (0.0194) 
 
L. government effectiveness 0.0116* -0.0124** 0.0110 0.0286** 
 
 
(0.00601) (0.00567) (0.00787) (0.0144) 
 
L.trade_euro -0.00488 0.0161 -0.0314*** -0.0161** 
 
 
(0.00389) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.00778) 
 
L.trade*gov 0.0310*** -0.0479* 0.0194* 0.0581* 
 
 
(0.00777) (0.0246) (0.0115) (0.0296) 
 
Crisis 2008 Dropped -0.0111* 0.0194** -0.00113 
 
  (0.00812) (0.00673) (0.00567)  
Observations 335 58 121 195 
 
R-squared 0.226 0.947 0.660 0.362 
 
Number of cod 19 4 7 11 
 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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One possible explanation is that in high income countries governments implemented 
policies that favoured efficiency over equity while the opposite occurred in low 
income countries. In any case, our model is admittedly too simplified to draw robust 
conclusions and this issue needs a further and deeper investigation. Eventually the 
global financial crisis affected negatively the income per capita in all the three groups 
of countries and inequality only in low income countries. 
7. Concluding remarks 
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that in OECD countries trade and 
financial openness exerted heterogeneous impacts on per capita GDP and income 
inequality, especially once considering separately country groups disentangled for 
“low”, “medium” and “high” income levels and differentiating the analysis for the 
short and long term.  
Interestingly enough, our results indicate that trade openness in the past two decades 
has had a positive impact on growth in the OECD as a whole both in short and long 
terms. Moreover, it improved mostly per capita GDP of low income members, 
consistently with the catching up theory. It also decreased inequality in low and 
middle income OECD countries in the short and long term, although to a different 
extent. Thus the evidence provided by this paper suggests that trade is a driver of 
sustainable and equitable growth and thus implementing protectionist measures 
might be detrimental for growth and increase inequality. 
The estimates results concerning financial integration are not unique. The latter has 
had a positive and significant impact on middle income countries’ growth but only in 
the short run. Thus, as opposed to trade, financial integration cannot be considered a 
permanent driver of growth. Moreover, it had an heterogeneous impact on income 
inequality among OECD country groups. It worsened income distribution in low 
income economies in the short term and in high income countries in the long run. 
These results suggest that given the very high heterogeneity of financial integration 
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effects even in the relatively homogeneous OECD group of countries, implementing 
“one size fits all” financial policies might be even counterproductive. A more coherent 
set of domestic and international policies might be more appropriate to make the 
financial channel reducing inequality and fostering sustainable growth. 
Looking at the fiscal control variables, interestingly enough, public spending is 
negatively related to growth but reduced inequality in the long run, especially in 
middle and high income countries. Nevertheless, the payment of interests on public 
debt hampers growth in the short run and worsens inequality, although with different 
intensity among the three income groups of countries. These results suggest that fiscal 
consolidation might have contributed to increase growth and reduce income 
inequality specifically through the reduction of the amount of interest paid on the 
public debt.  
Government effectiveness is positively related to growth in low income group. 
However, if we consider the interaction between the government effectiveness and 
trade openness it seems that in the long run and in the high income group of countries 
higher government effectiveness had a negative impact on income per capita. One 
possible explanation is that the effective implementation of provisions on 
environmental protection and product quality, that characterised the past two decades 
in the OECD, might have reduced overall trade profits margins and consequently 
income per capita. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Data description 
Trade openness (Exports +Imports)/GDPt-1 Source: OECD 
GDP per capita Levels, constant  Source: OECD and IMF 
Population Levels Source: World Bank 
Terms of trade (export value/export volume)/(import value /import volume) Source: OECD 
Financial 
openness 
Net foreign assets+ liabilities 
(NFA+NFL)/GDPt-1. 
Source: EWNII Milesi 
Ferretti (2017) 
R&D expenditure % of GDP Source: OECD 
Government 
effectiveness 
Government effectiveness captures 
perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. The index is 
based on over 30 individual data sources 
produced by a variety of survey institutes, 
think tanks, non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations, 
and private sector firms. Estimate of 
governance ranges from approximately -
2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance.  
Source: World Bank WGI 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010). 
 
Public 
expenditure % of GDP Source: OECD 
Interests on 
public debt % of GDP Source: OECD 
Gini index The Gini index computed on disposable income (income after taxes and benefits) 
Source: Standardized 
World Income Inequality 
Database, Solt (2016) 
Value added per 
worker with 
tertiary education 
% of VA ILO and OECD databases 
Labour share 
(Compensation of employees corrected 
for self-employed)/(Nominal value added 
at factors’ cost) 
Source: OECD 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics (1995-2016) 
VARIABLES N mean standard dev min max 
debt_GDP 845 57.63 38.29 3.664 242.1 
eu 888 0.377 0.485 0 1 
euro 888 0.235 0.424 0 1 
fin_open 808 10.15 37.80 0.410 333.8 
GDP_k 886 11.34 24.83 0.0900 187.8 
GDP_pck 886 33,086 14,893 8,066 99,515 
gfi 800 3.120e+12 3.632e+13 678,105 4.872e+14 
gini_disp 789 31.63 6.709 20.30 52.30 
gini_mkt 789 47.41 5.358 29 62 
goveff 735 1.328 0.573 -0.265 2.354 
infla 884 6.501 70.24 -1.676 2,076 
int_GDP 838 2.079 2.238 -2.965 16.38 
k_pc 453 14.47 13.55 0.427 62.86 
lp 738 0.773 0.364 0.105 2.087 
lp_a 690 0.0285 0.0147 0.00230 0.0954 
nfa 764 -85,078 739,199 -7.597e+06 3.420e+06 
pe_GDP 853 41.59 9.025 14.24 65.69 
ppe_GDP 838 39.55 8.821 13.79 63.73 
r_d 792 9.104e+11 2.004e+13 -5.929e+07 5.510e+14 
rulaw 735 1.283 0.610 -0.727 2.100 
teratt 668 26.92 10.28 7.011 56.27 
terms_trade 841 0.989 0.122 0.499 1.614 
trade_open 847 0.922 0.567 0.146 4.134 
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Table A3. Institutional quality, trade integration and income convergence between 
countries (1995-2016) 
  OECD low income* middle income high income 
D.trade_open 0.0976*** 0.258*** 0.0557** 0.0941*** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0813) (0.0240) (0.0300) 
D.fin_open 0.0142* -0.0324 0.0139 -0.00432 
 
(0.00802) (0.0505) (0.0103) (0.0139) 
D.terms_trade -0.0418 -0.419* -0.0858 -0.0309 
 
(0.0302) (0.218) (0.0531) (0.0396) 
D.ppe_GDP -0.153*** -0.164* -0.143*** -0.158*** 
 
(0.0201) (0.0807) (0.0378) (0.0227) 
D.int_GDP -0.00655** -0.0234 -0.00315 -0.00393 
 
(0.00282) (0.0164) (0.00438) (0.00456) 
D.lp_a 0.0251** -0.0620 0.0207 0.0374** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0422) (0.0207) (0.0159) 
D.gov -0.00868 0.0244 0.00356 -0.00496 
 
(0.00889) (0.0273) (0.0142) (0.0209) 
deu -0.00499 0.0156 -0.00362 -0.00668 
 
(0.00405) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.00616) 
D.trade_eu -0.00829 -0.0417 -0.00824 0.0252* 
 
(0.00876) (0.0404) (0.0224) (0.0131) 
D.trade_gov -0.0445*** -0.0320 -0.0182 -0.0309 
 
(0.0123) (0.0690) (0.0213) (0.0365) 
L.GDP_pck -0.112*** -0.262*** -0.0898*** -0.145*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.0642) (0.0303) (0.0326) 
L.trade_open 0.0788*** 0.263*** 0.0722*** 0.0654** 
 
(0.0109) (0.0553) (0.0204) (0.0255) 
L.fin_open 0.00624 0.0172 8.89e-05 0.00242 
 
(0.00479) (0.0459) (0.00659) (0.00780) 
L.terms_trade 0.0398*** -0.377 0.0441 0.0194 
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(0.0132) (0.271) (0.0296) (0.0154) 
L.ppe_GDP -0.109*** -0.0429 -0.135*** -0.125*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.0999) (0.0285) (0.0208) 
L.int_GDP 0.00272 -0.0271 0.00116 0.00982*** 
 
(0.00191) (0.0215) (0.00349) (0.00288) 
L.lp_a 0.0217*** -0.0376 0.0164 0.0281*** 
 
(0.00598) (0.0402) (0.0105) (0.00989) 
L.gov -0.00961 0.106*** -0.00694 0.00228 
 
(0.00785) (0.0258) (0.0145) (0.0216) 
L.trade_eu 0.00242 -0.0160 0.0165 0.0194 
 
(0.00656) (0.0497) (0.0250) (0.0121) 
L.trade_gov -0.0536*** -0.111 -0.0267 -0.0828** 
 
(0.0117) (0.101) (0.0251) (0.0379) 
Crisis_2008 -0.0233*** 0.00809 -0.0355*** -0.0240*** 
 
(0.00580) (0.0303) (0.0101) (0.00730) 
Constant 1.695*** 2.609*** 1.564*** 2.125*** 
 
(0.193) (0.858) (0.349) (0.390) 
Observations 470 61 202 207 
R-squared 0.730 0.971 0.721 0.803 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, the estimates controls for country and 
year FE 
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Table A4. Institutional quality, trade integration and income convergence within 
countries (1995-2016) 
  OECD low income* middle income high income 
D.trade_open -0.0170* -0.0157 -0.0268** -0.0288 
 
(0.0100) (0.0174) (0.0122) (0.0197) 
D.fin_open 0.0102 0.00805 0.00493 0.0109 
 
(0.00675) (0.0114) (0.00861) (0.00977) 
D.ppe_GDP -0.0220* -0.0329** -0.0217 -0.0101 
 
(0.0133) (0.0157) (0.0221) (0.0169) 
D.int_GDP 0.00225 -0.000148 0.00277 0.00254 
 
(0.00162) (0.00314) (0.00180) (0.00270) 
D.lp_a -0.00246 0.0149* 0.0403*** -0.0256** 
 
(0.00705) (0.00777) (0.0108) (0.0102) 
D.LS 0.0287 
 
-0.159** 0.201*** 
 
(0.0507) 
 
(0.0640) (0.0752) 
D.gov 0.00519 -0.0160** 0.00204 -0.000670 
 
(0.00634) (0.00631) (0.00681) (0.0137) 
deu 0.00299 0.000269 -0.0120* 0.0108** 
 
(0.00282) (0.00401) (0.00715) (0.00445) 
D.trade_eu 0.00290 0.0126 -0.0242** -0.00261 
 
(0.00513) (0.00827) (0.0101) (0.00849) 
D.trade_gov 0.0215** -0.0206 0.0189* 0.0475* 
 
(0.0100) (0.0155) (0.0108) (0.0261) 
L.ineq -0.116*** -0.250** -0.0719** -0.179*** 
 
(0.0219) (0.112) (0.0319) (0.0343) 
L.trade_open -0.00617 -0.0446** -0.0165* -0.0271 
 
(0.00679) (0.0210) (0.00987) (0.0194) 
L.fin_open 0.00265 0.0127 -0.0122* 0.00971* 
 
(0.00411) (0.0148) (0.00707) (0.00538) 
L.ppe_GDP -0.00954 -0.0302* -0.0403** 0.0104 
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(0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0202) (0.0163) 
L.int_GDP 0.00131 -0.000950 0.00465*** -0.00229 
 
(0.00122) (0.00414) (0.00153) (0.00195) 
L.lp_a 0.00592 0.0149** 0.00481 -0.0153** 
 
(0.00387) (0.00540) (0.00497) (0.00707) 
L.LS -0.0371 
 
-0.0854** 0.0504 
 
(0.0267) 
 
(0.0350) (0.0425) 
L.gov 0.0116* -0.0124** 0.0110 0.0286** 
 
(0.00601) (0.00567) (0.00787) (0.0144) 
L.trade_eu -0.00488 0.0161 -0.0314*** -0.0161** 
 
(0.00389) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.00778) 
L.trade_gov 0.0310*** -0.0479* 0.0194* 0.0581* 
 
(0.00777) (0.0246) (0.0115) (0.0296) 
2008.year 
 
-0.0111* 0.0194** -0.00113 
 (0.00567) (0.00812) (0.00673) (0.00567) 
Constant 0.598*** 1.039** 0.774*** 0.261 
 
(0.165) (0.383) (0.243) (0.230) 
Observations 335 58 121 195 
R-squared 0.226 0.947 0.660 0.362 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, the estimates controls for country and 
year FE 
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